Introduction*

By DAVID RIESMAN

SOME YEARS AGO Professor Lerner gave me the opportunity to read a number of translated interviews that had been done in Turkey and Lebanon. I studied them and, later, some of the interviews done in other countries of the Middle East, less to develop my very limited knowledge of the area, than out of my interest in the technique of the interview as a cultural form, as a mode of communication among the social strata as well as a mode of inquiry. I had long wondered how interviewing was even possible in Muslim cultures where relations between strangers of opposite sex were supposed to be jealously guarded and where, as in other traditional societies, an anthropologist might come and live in a community and gradually establish a role for himself, but hardly a passing interviewer whose motives could scarcely be grasped.

Indeed, there were barriers. It proved impossible to get the survey under way in Iraq. In uneasy Syria, the interviewer was sometimes taken for a spy; as one wrote:

> I heard that after I had finished this interview rumors started to go around that I belong to the F.B.I. looking for Communists. Others said I want to take their sons to Korea. . . . Although I had explained the matter and purpose of the interview yet people were very skeptical about it. And any time the name of any big power or the name of their government used to be mentioned, you feel that they are not at ease and give short dry answers, this is the attitude I met with most of the non-educated class.[1]

Moreover, as Professor Lerner explains, those more accessible to interviewing were consciously oversampled—men as against women; town and city dwellers as against farmers and nomads; readers and

radio listeners as against non-readers and non-listeners. For the effort of the studies was to sense the drift of opinion and feeling among those who counted or might possibly count politically. Nevertheless, the political orbit was drawn much wider than hierarchically-minded people concerned only with those now holding power would think made sense: many illiterates, peasants, and poor workers and unemployed were drawn into the net of the interviewing.

However, from the data in hand, we cannot know what all the obstacles were to getting the inarticulate to respond—the underdogs who, even in our own opinion-prone country, tell the interviewer that they have no views, that their feelings could not possibly interest any higher-ups, and won't he please go down the road and find someone else. Nevertheless, every so often in the chapters that follow one gets a glimpse of the interviewer at work (notably so in the town of Balgat at the outset). And one of the interviewers in Syria reports, in response to the final question which asked what the respondent thought of such interviews as this, that the latter blurted out:

> Why should *you* go to the Universities and study, while *my* children start working at ten years of age?

To be sure, such an "uncalled for" retort, with its class-conscious comparison, is very rare in the materials I read, and we learn from the rest of the interview that this man, a carpetweaver, is pro-Soviet—one of the tiny minority of workers deeply touched by proletarian rather than primarily nationalistic ideology.

Interviewers, in fact, bear to the bureaucracy of social research somewhat the same relation that foremen bear to industrial management: the interviewers mediate between the home office and the field, adjusting to the capabilities of particular respondents the demands for comparability and standardization that issue from central headquarters. Gaps of education and empathy, even within our own country, are sufficiently wide to make the "same" questions mean different things to different sorts of respondents. And any question is seldom, in the tone of the interviewer, the same question orally as it appears in print, despite the survey director's strenuous use of a kind of "Basic American" which will neither patronize the rich nor intimidate the poor. Correspondingly, the interviews on which Mr. Lerner relies were inevitably "translated" by those who

did them and who managed with differential effectiveness to blend distant queries with parochial understandings.

While the interviewers thought that they got better interviews from the more articulate, I found those interchanges at least as illuminating which went more awkwardly, as where the respondent stood on his privacy, or lacked that ready conversational coin of opinions which the process of the interview presupposes. In the Western countries where private opinion has become public, and vice versa, one finds only a tiny minority of "don't knows" among the overwhelming majority of "do knows," and little attention has been paid to this perhaps vanishing small group. But in the pre-industrial and pre-democratic lands, the "don't knows" still loom large. A characteristic answer is that of the Turkish peasant who, responding to the question as to what he would do if he were President, declared:

> My God! How can you ask such a thing? How can I . . . I cannot . . . president of Turkey . . . master of the whole world?

Correspondingly, many of the tradition-minded in these interviews, asked where they would like to live if they could not live in their native villages, said they would rather die; they could not conceive of living anywhere else, any more than of being somebody else.

Yet it should be noted that the concept "Turkey" was not strange to the man quoted above, and the concept "Egypt" was familiar even to the most depressed *fellahin*—though not all the nations of the Middle East have percolated their often newly established collective identity down to the remote villages. (The concept "Middle East," as Mr. Lerner points out, is alien both to the surviving parochial identities and to the nascent pan-Arab, pan-Islamic, and other more inclusive and mutually competing identities.) In this perspective, the interviews themselves give as well as get information: they are an aspect of secularization accompanying the mass media now beamed at the area, and informing people that they are Turks, Syrians, Arabs, and that other people are other things—thus replacing tribalism and isolation by nationalism, and folk proverbs by widely-distributed slogans and opinions.

The most dramatic material in this volume, in this perspective, concerns the speed with which traditional society is breaking down, prior to the coming of commerce, industrialism, or literacy.

As we know from many reports, this is happening everywhere, so much so that a young generation of anthropologists is growing up who cannot find tribes uninfluenced by Western contact. Even so, it is hard to realize the rapidity of change in the rate of change. Joyce Cary's wonderful novel, *Mr. Johnson,* may serve as an illustration. It describes a young West African clerk, educated in a mission, who is on the edge of literacy, and who has a vivid roseate picture, gained from consular officials, of "home," that is, Great Britain. The pathos of his situation is that, with his Bush wife and semi-acculturated fellow-clerks, he cannot move rapidly enough to take possession of the new estate of British gentleman held out to him; in the fashion of the *arriviste,* he overreaches himself dramatically, and crashes. Cary is extraordinarily sensitive to the pace as well as the pathos of African modernization; yet, reading his book published in 1939, one would never suppose that the successors to the Mr. Johnsons would bring forth an independent and politically alert and, in many strata, literate Ghana less than a generation later.

The pace of change has been immensely accelerated by the coming of mass media—radio and movies—which do not require the arduous steps of literacy; and, as we know from advertisers' experience within the United States, these media have come on the world stage along with many mass-produced consumer goods which have altered the imagery of ambition out of all keeping with traditional limits. While peasants could always wish for more livestock and land (as in Tolstoy's legend "How Much Land Does a Man Need?"), and a bigger house, and while people can slowly learn to want more money as an end in itself, the new consumer "durables" of the last few decades—such as radios, refrigerators, bicycles, even cars—have greatly reduced the traditional wantlessness of the impoverished, and have brought women as well as men into the orbit of desire.[2]

With wants come new opinions; with new opinions, new political awareness. Professor Lerner relates these trends by means of his concept of the "participant style" which has come about in the West with near-universal literacy, with industrialization and some degree of urbanization, and with free elections. But what happens when peoples skip steps (as, of course, the age-old processes of borrowing and diffusion always facilitate in some measure), moving from preliteracy or illiteracy to the post-literate stage of

the mass media, without the individuation, commercial and managerial skills, and occasional cultivation that accompany print? Mr. Lerner's book is also a story of pseudo-participants: of mobs on the streets of Cairo or Tehran who have been brought into the political process, though they lack the skills needed to make their new slogans come more nearly true. While analogous mobs were not wholly unknown to Imperial Rome or 19th Century Paris and New York, the continuous turmoil that the new media can encourage, and the new consumer goods entice, would seem to be new.

The mobs would not be there in such number, ejected from the land and without work or home in the city, were it not for the explosion of population brought about by modern sanitary measures. The hope of overcoming the Malthusian impasse in the countries of high population density and potential rests on achieving industrialization with such speed that the values of the low-birth-rate family would quickly spread, and thus prevent each increase in productivity from being eaten up by the growing excess of births, as in India and Egypt, where, as generally in the underdeveloped areas, deaths have dropped so much more quickly than births that all efforts at per capita economic progress are repeatedly set back.

Something of the same cancerous disproportion, it seems to me, has occurred with the spread of the newer media. People now are brought into the participant style who would earlier have lacked the chance to develop what Mr. Lerner calls the "mobile sensibility": the empathic readiness to try on a new way of life. Whereas once a few energetic spirits would have left an Anatolian or Lebanese village and come to Brazil or New York, today, as it were, Brazil and New York, Hollywood and the BBC, the Voice of the Arabs and many other impalpable voices, too, come to the village.[3] Not everyone listens, to be sure; and some of Mr. Lerner's most arresting work has gone into study of the differences in personality between the "Transitionals" who expose themselves to the media and those of like income, illiteracy, and physical setting who do not. But there are enough of these Transitionals, nomads of the spirit in search of a new identity, to prefigure the end of traditional society. As births have outrun deaths, so have opinions outrun opportunities.

The two problems are, of course, related. Malthus thought population run riot would be checked by famine, pestilence, and

war. What about opinions run riot? Mr. Lerner shows how, after the Aswan Dam defeat, Nasser became in some measure the captive of his own movement and its polemics: in the face of the immense technical and psychological obstacles to industrial development and its cultural concommitants, the mobile sensibility of the Transitionals tended to push him toward profitless adventurism. It is depressing to read the Egyptian interviews where, one after another, even the very highly educated respondents say, when asked what can be done about the poverty they agree is terrible, that driving out the British (this was 1950) or destroying Israel will do it. To be sure, Israel's own nationalism and expansionism may somewhat increase the cost of Egypt's defense, and driving out the British may increase Egypt's élan and sense of self-chosen destiny. But, to the outsider, the gulf between Egyptian aspirations and realistic plans (and the same is true, *pari passu*, elsewhere) appears much greater than that of European nations in their formative stages—for the latter, of course, did not have their aspirations set by the present Western model of military strength and economic prosperity. Paradoxically, in one sense the nascent opinions do not run riot enough: slogans proliferate and swirl around a few nationalistic themes, but the interviews (possibly hampered in this respect by their form and level of approach) are not marked by great heterogeneity of outlook within socioeconomic categories.

In any event, the kind of sloganized xenophobia and suspiciousness which turns up in many interviews with well-educated members of the middle classes (of course, in other interviews one discovers more cosmopolitan types, secular in spirit and moderate in temper) is the kind one is apt to find in the United States among the least educated, that is, people who are participant enough to have and voice opinions, but not middle-class or well-educated enough to be moderate, soft-spoken, and more or less tolerant and trustful. The *pre*-literate, to the extent they still exist in the Middle East, cannot be called nationalistic or bigoted; they are simply voiceless, or speak with the voice of tradition. But the illiterate and the post-literate have absorbed the shorthand aims of the mobile literate leaders—men who, as in Pakistan, can produce explosive awakenings of nationalism (in Pakistan, with a million dead and sixteen million made homeless, the end is not yet). Certainly, inventions worked out in the West, such as federalism and judicial protection of minority rights (which offer bulkheads

against bigotry in America), seem of scant possibility when ethnic blocs and religious sects, newly armed with slogans and the power to harm, struggle at once to establish an identity and to mark its boundaries. Thus, while we can prefigure the end of tradition, it is hard to envisage the beginning of enlightenment.

Yet perhaps such misgivings (which I harbor also concerning the future of the West in the age of the atom), and the use of such terms as "enlightenment" (which of course itself easily becomes a "tradition"), may only mark the limits of my imagination. It is conceivable that the birth-rate may drop in the countries of the Middle East without extensive industrialization and urbanization, even though I cannot foresee politically feasible steps in such a development. For it is not only Westerners who find it hard not to assume that the non-Western nations must either fail or follow one of the courses already marked out by the West: as I have already indicated, the nations of the Middle East, hungry for jets and steel plants, are possessed by the same blueprints, either in their Victorian or Soviet forms. The new trajectories required, in densely populated countries, to break through the vicious circles of poverty and polemic, scarcely exist, and the adumbrations provided by Point IV and the Marshall Plan no longer command the support of Southern congressmen, fearful of the competition of Egyptian cotton and moving toward an isolationism akin to that of the small towns of the Midwest. The imperative hope that India might provide another alternative, with American aid on the County Agent model, seems slim as these lines are written.

Mr. Lerner adopts, in dealing with these matters, a contrast coined by Macaulay in considering Italian attitudes toward Machiavelli: the contrast of "courage cultures" and "ingenuity cultures." The Arabs in recent centuries appear to have emphasized the former (even while occasionally practicing the latter), and today much intellectual activity in Egypt and elsewhere goes into explanations of how modernity can be achieved without violating Islamic tradition—or how, on the contrary, it cannot. My own impression is that the ingenuity needed to escape the all-too-evident impasses in the Middle East can neither be imported nor be locally engendered without a lessening of the dominant male values, what the Spanish term "*machismo*." A greater equality between the sexes would seem to be requisite before many of the approaches toward

modernization can make sense. Thus, for men to cooperate with each other outside of kin connections, they must not see each other merely as sexual rivals.[4] And for them to learn easily things which are not already "in the culture" requires that their vanity be moderated, so that they do not become defensive about ignorance or resentful of those who know more. In Japan, where modernization appears on the whole to have been achieved syncretistically rather than destructively, women were not veiled and kept apart; though outwardly they seemed humble before men, they took full part in domestic and agricultural life. Since Professor Lerner shows us that women, even in the more advanced countries such as Lebanon, remain far less educated and aware than men, and since sex roles are so basically reinforced by patterns of child-rearing, the chances for lessening the constraints of a "courage culture" do not strike me as good in those parts of the Muslim world where the Prophet has been read as bringing equality of races but not of men and women.

Yet Mr. Lerner, being an American bred in what I suppose is now the world's leading example of an "ingenuity culture," does not lose heart as he contemplates the spectrum of Middle Eastern misery. He takes up the countries of the area one by one, illuminating the immense disparities. He begins with the Turks, whose political and social putsch under Kemal Atatürk preceded the coming of the newer media; hence, Atatürk taught a generation of Turks to read a modern script and got something of a head start on literacy and industrialization. There is a benign poignancy about the attitude of the Chief in Balgat, who has lost his moral hegemony with the coming of roads and radios, and who told Professor Lerner:

> I am the last *Muhtar* of Balgat, and I am happy that I have seen Balgat end its history in the way that we are going. . . . people will have to get used to different ways and then some of the excesses, particularly among the young, will disappear. The young people are in some ways a serious disappointment; they think more of clothes and good times than they do of duty and family and country. But it is to be hoped that as the *Demokrat* men complete the work they have begun, the good Turkish ways will again come forward to steady the people.[5] Meanwhile, it is well that people can have to eat and to buy shoes they always needed but could not have. . . .

Mr. Lerner journeys next to Lebanon, along with Turkey the most "modern" of his group: Lebanon, with its commercial traditions; its attractive if precarious pluralism, including Christians, Druzes, and various Muslim sects; its residual ties to France (ties found among the more cosmopolitan in Turkey and Egypt, as in all the Western world as well); and its sometimes courageous, sometimes corrupt resistance to government by assassination.

No interviews were done in Israel, where colonists of European origin often avow toward the Arabs a condescending outlook reminiscent of the American colonists' view of the Indians (there are many courageous exceptions, as in the Ihud group), and where a modern urban irredentist nationalism combines technocratic superiority with traces of quasi-socialist, folk-society mystique. Israel appears in this study only as one of the major symbols (in Jordan, as perhaps now in Egypt, the major one) around which the self-deracinating cadres of the neighboring countries seek to define what they are not, in a war-dance as ambivalent (for these men want technical superiority, too) as it is presently self-defeating. Jordan, in fact, scarcely seems an entity in these interviews, which range from Beduins, who know of the radio only that it is the Voice of the Devil emanating from the effeminate cities, to exiled Palestinian Arabs of the professional class listening to every stir in the air-waves with embittered hope of return.

Whereas Lebanon appears stable enough to allow Mr. Lerner to worry about its unfavorable trade balances, in Jordan and Syria he worries about achieving any political balance amid the competing factions of the limited elites and their constituencies among the "Transitionals." In Egypt, as I have implied, he explores the "Nasser syndrome," the surrender of sensible socioeconomic goals for strenuous symbolic ones, which stave off no births and pay no bills. In Iran, he notices the emergence with Mossadegh of some of the pseudo-"participative" patterns so marked in Egypt, although on the whole Iran remains closest to tradition. Its elite have become to some degree pawns of the Cold War, but they are not yet entirely pawns of the mobs they have begun to arouse. Thus, in Iran the leadership sometimes exploits its secular knowledge to serve traditional purposes, rather than the "objective-historical" purposes a Westerner would think made sense. And the moody ties that bind the literate and the preliterate help give Iranian politics a fatalistic rather than a desperate air.

Mr. Lerner, proceeding in this country by country fashion, finds himself making alternating uses of the different perspectives of the established social sciences: economics in Lebanon, demography in Egypt, public administration in Jordan and Iran. And these perspectives lead him to propose the strategies of rational growth, of eschewing dreams and proceeding soberly along the paths to the present already marked out by the historical experience of modernization in the West. He even counsels the Lebanese to appoint public officials on the basis of merit, not ethnicity—although their present procedure does not seem so very different from the tactic of "racial balance" in American electoral campaigns. Yet it is not the detailed proposals but the general belief that there must be a way—a way out of poverty and the psychic constriction of the "Traditionals"—that links the author of this volume with his own national tradition.

But this very American belief that there is a way is a dream. And Professor Lerner, as a student of communications, understands that it is dreams that inspire not only new wants but new solutions —as well as violent gestures toward modernity. What seems required from his perspectives is an allopathic rationing of dreams, enough to spark the religion of progress, of advance, without inciting to riot. (We can see in the behavior of our own juvenile delinquents —also adept in imbibing the messages of the media—that this is not easy to manage. The emotional and political fluency of newly-liberated illiterates can be quite terrifying.) Bertrand Russell, in his *History of Western Philosophy,* makes an analogous point about the spread of ideas:

> . . . a philosophy, developed in a politically and economically advanced country, which is, in its birthplace, little more than a clarification and systematization of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere a source of revolutionary ardour and, ultimately, of actual revolution. It is mainly through theorists that the maxims regulating the policy of advanced countries become known to less advanced countries. In the advanced countries, practice inspires theory; in the others theory inspires practice.

In Russell's sense, a movie image of life in America, for all its documentary detail, is a radical "theory" when it appears on the screens of Cairo, Ankara, or Tehran.

Yet it is to the credit of American empathy and generosity, as well as to our naiveté, that we have been willing to promote that theory, and to stand throughout the world as apostles of modernity.

We may smile at the images of America that turn up in these interviews: the "clean and rich life" seen by a Turkish grammar school graduate; the grocery store with "myriads of round boxes, clean and all the same dressed, like soldiers in a great parade"[6] which the grocer of Balgat, eager to visit America, had seen in a film; the no less eloquent vision of an agricultural engineer:

> Ever since I was a child I used to dream and think about people. I used to imagine all people equal, having nice homes. In my imagination I used to send their children to school and educate them. Now, as an adult, I know that America is that country I used to dream about.

The British in the Arab world have tended to prefer the Chief to the Grocer, and perhaps the Beduin to the agronomist. They have admired gentlemanly conduct more than the consumer or trader mentality, "courage cultures" more than "ingenuity cultures." Though there are plenty of Americans who share the values of T. E. Lawrence (or the metaphorically somewhat similar ones of D. H. Lawrence), these do not predominate in our view of the Middle East, and of course not in our teaching at Robert College or the American University of Beirut. Whatever our own misgivings about the "great parade" of cans at the supermarket, whatever our awareness that we do not live up to the dream of the Turkish agronomist, and that if we did, our life would still lack meaning, we cannot bring ourselves to begrudge others the literacies and comforts that no longer wholly assuage us. Just as only an arrogant and heartless rich man can say to the poor man, "Why do you want my job, with my troubles and taxes?," so very few Americans are likely to say to the Turks: "Don't be like us," and even fewer to say: "Don't be like us even in your own particularistic way."

Even so, there are a number of Americans who do feel this way about preliterate tribes they have lived among as anthropologists. They would hardly speak of "their" people, as Mr. Lerner speaks of the Traditionals in this volume, as "constricted"; rather, they may find themselves challenged in their deepest premises, whatever their professions of neutrality. Most anthropologists, I believe, have felt that admirable patterns of culture were perishing on the periphery of the advancing West, and it was a major wrench of perspective for Margaret Mead, on returning to the Manus after twenty-five years, not to be sad that they had opted

for the American ideas of progress and democracy.[7] I have asked myself why so little of this feeling, familiar enough to sociologists, has found its way into Professor Lerner's account. And it occurred to me that it may be harder to love and admire illiterates than preliterates. The former live in a world which is in part modern and communicative. They have lost many of their most active and enterprising spirits to that world, only a few of whom have returned, as priests or doctors or agitators, to try to enlighten or alleviate—or exploit—their own. In *Fontemara* Ignazio Silone implies that the South Italian peasants whom he loves would be better off if not even literate enough for speech, for then their tyrants could only beat them, as they beat donkeys, but could not sway or deceive them. Robert Redfield, who has written sensitively on such matters, draws the distinction between peasants who live within the ambiance of others' literacy, gaining from it crumbs of a culture not their own, and preliterates in a truly isolated orbit (at least potentially so, as on relatively inaccessible islands or pueblos) who have built their own culture over time.

Then, too, quite apart from such theoretical distinctions, there may be strong temperamental disharmonies between some cultures and others, as between individuals who "should" like each other but just don't. I recall a young anthropologist telling me how, thoroughly steeped in cultural relativism, he had reacted only sympathetically to "his" tribe of Central American Indians until one day he found he couldn't stand the way they kicked dogs—all sorts of rites, and what Mr. Lerner would call constrictions, did not faze him, but cruelty to dogs made him squirm. In what I have said, I have already implied my own allergy to the oppression of women. Many of the Muslims described in this book will strike some Americans as harsh without grandeur, superior to women without gallantry. Charles Morris in *Paths of Life* indicates on largely ideological grounds the strong antitheses between Christian or Buddhist values and those of traditional Islam.[8]

But stronger perhaps than ideological and religious differences are the barriers imposed by the growing wealth of Americans in contrast to the increasing poverty of the overpopulated countries like Egypt. Even our empathic strata, of which anthropologists are among the avant-garde, have trouble understanding squalor where it is neither picturesque nor stable. And the very fact that non-Westerners have often incorporated many

Western aspirations makes them either tongue-tied or fanatical in seeking to expound their own values to us in terms we can grasp.[9] Thus, while Mr. Lerner may approve of those Middle East illiterates who appear to have moved away from tradition, it is possible that the forms of tradition in question are, for him and for many of us, simply among its less appealing versions.

But if that is so, it may work the other way, too, and make the crossing of the historic barriers harder still. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that "the" Arabs were once a great civilization. The illiterate in his depression, and the modernizer in his impatience, live amid the ruins of greatness. How open and how empathic will Americans be, how magnanimous, if our turn comes to live amid the ruins of our modernity?

While Mr. Lerner shows that every encounter with another people is a confrontation with ourselves—a theme he develops in observing how listening to the radio may at once unsettle people and create feelings of identity among the newly unbound—his major tasks in this book are, on the one hand, to present portraits of the several countries (some of which are more "country-like" than others) and, on the other hand, to develop a typology of transition to illuminate both the portraits and the global movements of peoples they represent. I want to say a few words in conclusion about this typology. Most typologies in sociology are dualistic or dichotomous: folk-urban; *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*; status-to-contract; cosmopolitan-local; sacred-secular; and so forth. Mr. Lerner's cast of characters puts the Moderns on the one side—they are cosmopolitan, urban, literate, usually well-off, and seldom devout—and the Traditionals on the other side—they are just the opposite. But in between he puts several categories of Transitionals: people who share some of the empathy and psychic mobility of the Moderns while lacking essential components of the Modern style, notably literacy. These Transitionals are the men in motion, variously proportioned in the different countries, who listen to American jazz in Beirut, to the trusted BBC even in Cairo, to the Voice of the Arabs and Radio Moscow in Damascus. Many of them don't live in a city—yet. But, already encouraged by the media into ecological window-shopping, they can imagine living in one—even in one outside their native land.

There are, however, evident technical problems about extrapol-

ating from one-shot interviews into the careers of men in motion. Thus, while the questionnaire got certain biographical data and allowed one to see something of the interviewee's orientation at a specific point in time, yet "Transitional" is a dynamic category —here presented without triangulation. Undoubtedly, some who are categorized as "Transitional" are simply members for life of a class which is open at both ends—a middle class; they may even be a major source of their country's transition without having themselves greatly altered their outlook or their exposure to the media. ("Modern," of course, is no fixed destiny, but a relative term: by the time some "Transitionals" go "Modern," that constellation will have changed.)

Despite such ambiguities, inevitable in a first approximation, I believe that Mr. Lerner is justified in using a moving term on the basis of a snapshot interview—using a term, moreover, which applies both to the respondent's style of life and to his (highly correlated) responsiveness to mass communications. For the author's purposes are contemporary, not timeless, and they lead him to emphasize what is changing and likely to change rather than what, by high fortune or low, seems for the time being more fully stabilized and polarized. However an individual in the Transitional bracket might describe his own fate, we, the outsiders, view his destiny in terms of our preoccupations—which, nevertheless, are now also partially his—and we can, in terms of our own history, visualize potentials in his attitudes which he himself as yet lacks the insight to interpret. (How long a time will it be before he is sending researchers to America and putting us in categories beyond our own horizons?)

As I have said, the Transitional is defined as one who attends to the mass media, but cannot read. What will a society look like which is dominated by such "post-literate" types? What will religion be like when freed both from oral tradition and from a book? These futures are hard to conceive, for print still has prestige all over the world, partly because the elder statesmen were nurtured on it, and partly because it has been the Western and Christian road to advance (just as it has been the road among the Chinese civil servants). In the West, print was the first mass medium, slowly absorbed; the newer media have been cumulative, and they have upset old elites and old values only slowly. (Indeed, in the United States, the media do not so much displace each other as displace

other things, such as work and conversation.) Eventually perhaps, or so I would hope, the newer media may provide tie-ins to print, so that people suckled on film and radio may be weaned on books. We must never forget the enthusiasm for knowledge, for understanding, of people just a step away from Tradition—the hunger for print of the Puritans, of the Russians in the 20's, of the Mexicans and the Filipinos today. A Syrian hairdresser expresses in this book his great unhappiness because

> I am illiterate and so can understand nothing about life. Another thing that makes me unhappy is my inability to teach my only son, and I can't find the way how to do this.

A preliterate, of course, would not say that: he knows that he understands life, and that his son will be taught the one and only way. But on the evidence of this book and others in the same demesne, there are very few preliterates left, and the illiterates are no longer clear as to who they are, or as to "the way how." In this sense, we are becoming one world, even while nationalism and the search for technological prowess are supplying the false and facile answers and the new illiteracy of seeming understanding.

went back several times, once with gifts for the Chief's grandchildren, another time with my camera (as he had coyly suggested) to take his picture. On these visits I felt less tense, asked fewer questions, than during the earlier visits. The last time I went out with the publisher of a prominent Istanbul newspaper ("The New York Times of Turkey"), a dedicated *Demokrat* man, who was eager to see the transformed village I had described to him. He was enchanted with the Chief, the stores, the bus service and electricity and other symbols of the history into which his party had ushered Balgat. He decided to write a feature story about it and asked permission to call it "Professor Lerner's Village." I declined, less from modesty than a sense of anachronism. The Balgat his party needed was the suburb inhabited by the sons of the Chief, with their swaddled children and their proud new clock, their male "corners" and their retail stores, their filiopietistic silence and their movies that teach excitement. The ancient village I had known for what now seemed only four short years was passing, had passed. The Grocer was dead. The Chief —"the last *Muhtar* of Balgat"—had reincarnated the Grocer in the flesh of his sons. Tosun was in North Africa studying the Berbers.

II.

Modernizing Styles of Life: A Theory

> "I am thankful that the good God created us all ignorant. I am glad that when we change His plans in this regard we have to do it at our own risk."
>
> —MARK TWAIN

> "The United States is presiding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the entire world."
>
> —ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED

THE PASSING OF BALGAT is but an instance of the passing of traditional society in the Middle East. The modernizing of ancient lifeways involves many Tosuns and shepherds, many grocers and chiefs, many sons of chiefs. For the stakes of modernization, as Mark Twain suggests, are deep and personal. Secular enlightenment does not easily replace sacred revelation in the guidance of human affairs. Sacred codes, once revealed and transmitted through the shepherd, provide simple rules of conduct for all the flock—who can remain ignorant or, more profoundly, innocent. But secular enlightenment each man must get for himself. Many individuals must struggle through the loss of ignorance-as-bliss in the making of a new secular "climate of opinion."

Western men need only reflect on the titanic struggles whereby, over the course of centuries, medieval lifeways were supplanted by modernity. Hindsight now summarizes these struggles as The Age of Exploration, The Renaissance, The Reformation, The Counter-Reformation, The Industrial Revolution. But well we know that this historical sequence worked itself out through millions of individual lives; that many suffered, others prospered, while their world was being reshaped in the modern image. In the end—and the end is not yet—all men of the West had acquired a new style of life.

A similar process is under way in the Middle East. The underlying tensions are everywhere much the same—village *versus* town, land *versus* cash, illiteracy *versus* enlightenment, resignation *versus* ambition, piety *versus* excitement. But the process reaches people in different settings and induces different dilemmas of personal choice. In Turkey a grocer exhilarated by the sight of a city must live out his life in a traditional village; in Iran a newly entrepreneurial peasant proudly owns the first store-bought suit in his walled hamlet but rarely dares to wear it among his envious fellows; in Jordan an illiterate Beduin chieftain professes the tribal law of the desert but plans to send his son abroad to school; in Lebanon an educated Muslim girl loves the movies but fears her orthodox parents; in Syria an under-educated, over-ambitious clerk dreams of being a Tito; in Egypt a young engineer has eaten pork in the West and seeks atonement in the Muslim Brotherhood. To locate these diverse figures in the modernizing Middle East is our aim. The parable of Balgat conveys some sense of the varied questions and answers, pleasures and pains, which modernization brings into the lives of people so variously situated. But Balgat is a miniature; what we need is a landscape.

Landscaping requires some principle of unity in diversity. The source of Middle East unity is a thorny problem of scholarship, complicated by the recent efforts of ideologues to impose a definition that will be politically usable rather than historically valid. Scholars seem agreed that the current ideologies tend to obscure and evade some real issues. The people of the area today are unified not by their common solutions but by their common problems: how to modernize traditional lifeways that no longer "work" to their own satisfaction. Some seek salvation in past pieties—the recourse to Islamic solidarity providing in this sense a parallel to the Crusades, which, in the name of orthodoxy, hastened the passing of medievalism and coming of modernity in the West. But, underlying the ideologies, there pervades the Middle East a sense that the old ways must go because they no longer satisfy the new wants. A world conference of leading Islamists recently concluded:

> The disorder and poverty which rage in the Middle East . . . seem incapable of being remedied except by a greater solidarity among Islamic countries and by a general modernization of these countries. But though modernization is a tangible fact, only the pace of which might require control and acceleration, Muslim solidarity is only a fleeting, variable, uncertain supposition.[1]

Modernization, then, is the unifying principle in this study of the varied Middle East. The term is imposed by recent history. Earlier one spoke of Europeanization, to denote the common elements underlying French influence in Syria-Lebanon and British influence in Egypt and Jordan. More recently, following a century of educational and missionary activity, Americanization became a specific force and the common stimuli of the Atlantic civilization came to be called Westernization. Since World War II, the continuing search for new ways has been coupled with repudiation of the Western aegis. Soviet and other modernizing models, as illustrated by India and Turkey, have become visible in the area. Any label that today localizes the process is bound to be parochial. For Middle Easterners more than ever want the modern package, but reject the label "made in U.S.A." (or, for that matter, "made in USSR"). We speak, nowadays, of modernization.

Whether from East or West, modernization poses the same basic challenge—the infusion of "a rationalist and positivist spirit" against which, scholars seem agreed, "Islam is absolutely defenseless."[2] The phasing and modality of the process have changed, however, in the past decade. Where Europeanization once penetrated only the upper level of Middle East society, affecting mainly leisure-class fashions, modernization today diffuses among a wider population and touches public institutions as well as private aspirations with its disquieting "positivist spirit." Central to this change is the shift in modes of communicating ideas and attitudes—for spreading among a large public vivid images of its own New Ways is what modernization distinctly does. Not the class media of books and travel, but the mass media of tabloids, radio and movies, are now the dominant modes. Today's Middle East "chaos" is largely due to the shift of modernist inspiration from the discreet discourse of a few in Oxford colleges and Paris salons to the broadcast exhortations among the multitudes by the mass media.

This historic shift stimulated the inquiry begun in 1950, of which this book is the outcome. The role of new messages in the Middle East "transition" raised a breviary of empirical questions: who was changing? from what to what? how fast? with what effects? While the great debate over Permanence *versus* Change often obliges the Middle Easterner to declare himself philosophi-

cally on such questions, we investigate them here in a more limited sense. We focus on the personal meaning of social change—the transformations worked into the daily lifeways of individuals by these large historical forces.

That some millions of Turks now live in towns, work in shops, wear trousers and have opinions who, a generation ago, lived in the centuries-old *sholvars* symbolizing the agrarian, illiterate, isolate life of the Anatolian village is what modernization has already done to some people. That other millions throughout the Middle East are yearning to trade in their old lives for such newer ways is what modernization promises to most people. The rapid spread of these new desires, which provide the dynamic power of modernization, is most clearly perceived in the coming of the mass media. To see why this is so—to comprehend what the Middle Eastern peoples are experiencing under the title of modernization —we remind ourselves of what, historically, happened in the West. For the sequence of current events in the Middle East can be understood as a deviation, in some measure a deliberate deformation, of the Western model.

This observational standpoint implies no ethnocentrism. As we shall show, the Western model of modernization exhibits certain components and sequences whose relevance is global. Everywhere, for example, increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has "gone with" wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting). The model evolved in the West is an historical fact. That the same basic model reappears in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed, will be shown in this chapter. The point is that the secular process of social change, which brought modernization to the Western world, has more than antiquarian relevance to today's problems of the Middle East transition. Indeed, the lesson is that Middle Eastern modernizers will do well to study the historical sequence of Western growth.

Taking the Western model of modernization as a baseline is forced upon us, moreover, by the tacit assumptions and proclaimed goals which prevail among Middle East spokesmen. That some of these leaders, when convenient for diplomatic maneuver, denounce the West is politically important and explains why we have chosen

to speak of "modernization" rather than "Westernization." Rather more important, Western society still provides the most developed model of societal attributes (power, wealth, skill, rationality) which Middle East spokesmen continue to advocate as their own goal. Their own declared policies and programs set our criteria of modernization. From the West came the stimuli which undermined traditional society in the Middle East; for reconstruction of a modern society that will operate efficiently in the world today, the West is still a useful model. What the West is, in this sense, the Middle East seeks to become.

But these societies-in-a-hurry have little patience with the historical *pace* of Western development; what happened in the West over centuries, some Middle Easterners now seek to accomplish in years. Moreover, they want to do it their "own way." A complication of Middle East modernization is its own ethnocentrism—expressed politically in extreme nationalism, psychologically in passionate xenophobia. The hatred sown by anticolonialism is harvested in the rejection of every appearance of foreign tutelage. Wanted are modern institutions but not modern ideologies, modern power but not modern purposes, modern wealth but not modern wisdom, modern commodities but not modern cant. It is not clear, however, that modern ways and words can be so easily and so totally sundered. Underlying the variant ideological forms which modernization took in Europe, America, Russia, there have been certain behavioral and institutional compulsions common to all. These historical regularities some Middle East leaders now seek to obviate, trying instead new routes and risky by-passes. We alert ourselves to the novelty of these efforts by recapitulating briefly some essential elements in the modernization of the West.

1. The Mobile Personality: Empathy

People in the Western culture have become habituated to the sense of change and attuned to its various rhythms. Many generations ago, in the West, ordinary men found themselves unbound from their native soil and relatively free to move. Once they actually moved in large numbers, from farms to flats and from fields to factories, they became intimate with the idea of change by direct experience.[3] This bore little resemblance to the migrant or crusading hordes of yore, driven by war or famine. This was move-

ment by individuals, each having made a personal choice to seek elsewhere his own version of a better life.

Physical mobility so experienced naturally entrained social mobility, and gradually there grew institutions appropriate to the process. Those who gained heavily by changing their address soon wanted a convenient bank in the neighborhood to secure their treasure; also a law-and-police force to guard the neighborhood against disorder and devaluation; also a voice in prescribing standards of behavior for others.[4] So came into operation a "system" of bourgeois values that embraced social change as normal. Rules of the game had to be worked out for adjudicating conflicts over the direction and rate of change. Who was to gain, how, and how much? As the profits to be gained from mobility became evident to all, conflicts over access to the channels of opportunity became sharper. The process can be traced through the evolution of Western property and tax laws, whose major tendency is to protect the "haves" without disqualifying the "have-nots."[5] It was by protecting every man's *opportunity* to gain that the modern West turned decisively in the direction of social mobility.

Social institutions founded on voluntary participation by mobile individuals required a new array of skills and a new test of merit. Every person, according to the new democratic theory, was equally entitled to acquire the skills needed for shaping his own "future" in the Great Society. The vigorous controversy over public education that agitated the eighteenth century produced a net affirmation of equal opportunity. In every Western country the verdict was pronounced that education should be freely available to all who wanted it, and in some countries whether they wanted it or not. Thus the idea spread that personal mobility is itself a first-order value; the sense grew that social morality is essentially the ethics of social change. A man is what he may become; a society is its potential. These notions passed out of the realm of debate into the Western law and mores.

A mobile society has to encourage rationality, for the calculus of choice shapes individual behavior and conditions its rewards. People come to see the social future as manipulable rather than ordained and their personal prospects in terms of achievement rather than heritage. Rationality is purposive: ways of thinking and acting are instruments of intention (not articles of faith); men succeed or fail by the test of what they accomplish (not what they

worship). So, whereas traditional man tended to reject innovation by saying "It has never been thus," the contemporary Westerner is more likely to ask "Does it work?" and try the new way without further ado.

The psychic gap between these two postures is vast. It took much interweaving through time, between ways of doing and ways of thinking, before men could work out a style of daily living with change that felt consistent and seamless. The experience of mobility through successive generations gradually evolved participant lifeways which feel "normal" today. Indeed, while past centuries established the public practices of the mobile society, it has been the work of the twentieth century to diffuse widely a *mobile sensibility* so adaptive to change that rearrangement of the self-system is its distinctive mode.

The mobile personality can be described in objective and technical fashion. Since this is what the book is largely about, it will do here to define its main feature and to suggest the main line of its secular evolution. The mobile person is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment; he comes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside of his habitual experience. These mechanisms for enlarging a man's identity operate in two ways. *Projection* facilitates identification by assigning to the object certain preferred attributes of the self—others are "incorporated" because they are like me. (Distantiation or negative identification, in the Freudian sense, results when one projects onto others certain disliked attributes of the self.) *Introjection* enlarges identity by attributing to the self certain desirable attributes of the object—others are "incorporated" because I am like them or want to be like them. We shall use the word *empathy* as shorthand for both these mechanisms. This condensation of psychoanalytic terminology has a pragmatic, not theoretic, intent—since our materials are simply not amenable to the more highly differentiated categories of Freudian vocabulary. Our interview data does not permit systematic discrimination between the introjective and projective mechanisms. Nor does empathy denote sympathy or antipathy. In particular cases it may lead to either—"understanding" may breed dislike as well as affection.

We are interested in empathy as the inner mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to *operate efficiently* in a changing

world. Empathy, to simplify the matter, is the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation. This is an indispensable skill for people moving out of traditional settings. Ability to empathize may make all the difference, for example, when the newly mobile persons are villagers who grew up knowing all the extant individuals, roles and relationships in their environment. Outside his village or tribe, each must meet new individuals, recognize new roles, and learn new relationships involving himself. A rich literature of humor and pathos once dealt with the adventures of the country bumpkin in the Big City, the bewildered immigrant in a strange land. They had to learn their way in these new settings. Learn, in swelling numbers, they did. The story of the 19th century West includes this learning, which now enters the story of the 20th century East. Accordingly, we are interested in the mobile personality mainly as a social phenomenon with a history. Our concern is with the large historical movement, now becoming visible in the Middle East, of which an enlarged capacity for empathy is the distinctive psychic component. Our interest is to clarify the process whereby the high empathizer tends to become also the cash customer, the radio listener, the voter.[6]

It is a major hypothesis of this study that high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and *participant*. Traditional society is nonparticipant—it deploys people by kinship into communities isolated from each other and from a center; without an urban-rural division of labor, it develops few needs requiring economic interdependence; lacking the bonds of interdependence, people's horizons are limited by locale and their decisions involve only other *known* people in *known* situations. Hence, there is no need for a transpersonal common doctrine formulated in terms of shared secondary symbols—a national "ideology" which enables persons unknown to each other to engage in political controversy or achieve "consensus" by comparing their opinions. Modern society is participant in that it functions by "consensus"—individuals making personal decisions on public issues must concur often enough with other individuals they do not know to make possible a stable common governance. Among the marks of this historic achievement in social organization, which we call Participant Society, are that most people go through school, read newspapers, receive cash payments in jobs they are legally free to change, buy goods for cash

in an open market, vote in elections which actually decide among competing candidates, and express opinions on many matters which are not their personal business.

Especially important, for the Participant Style, is the enormous proportion of people who are expected to "have opinions" on public matters—and the corollary expectation of these people that their opinions will matter. It is this subtly complicated structure of reciprocal expectation which sustains widespread empathy. Only in the lowest reaches of America's social hierarchy, for example, is it still discussed whether people *ought* to have opinions. In a climactic scene of *Sweet Thursday,* John Steinbeck relates how the Madam of a whorehouse prepares one of her hustlers, not really made for the business, to go out into the world of respectability. The first rule is to keep her mouth shut:

> Next thing is opinions. You and me is always busting out with opinions. Hell, Suzy, we ain't got no opinions! We just say stuff we heard or seen in the movies. We're scared stiff we'll miss something, like running for a bus. That's the second rule: lay off opinions because you ain't really got any.

As Suzy moves from the anarchic margins of American life into solid citizenry, it is foreseen, she will learn to have opinions along the way. In the Middle East many more people have a much longer way to go. "How can you ask me such a question?" gasped the Balgat shepherd. His gasp resounded often in our interviews around the Middle East.

For, in any society, only when the accepted model of behavior is emulated by the population at large does it become the predominant personal style. The model of behavior developed by modern society is characterized by empathy, a high capacity for rearranging the self-system on short notice. Whereas the isolate communities of traditional society functioned well on the basis of a highly constrictive personality, the interdependent sectors of modern society require widespread participation. This in turn requires an expansive and adaptive self-system, ready to incorporate new roles and to identify personal values with public issues. This is why modernization of any society has involved the great characterological transformation we call psychic mobility. The latent statistical assertion involved here is this: In modern society *more* individuals exhibit *higher* empathic capacity than in any previous society.

As history has not been written in these terms, we were obliged to organize our own forays into historical data to establish a trace-line on the evolution of the participant society and the mobile personality. We restrain our account of these forays to some main lines which lead directly to the problem in hand.

2. The Mobility Multiplier: Mass Media

The historic increase of psychic mobility begins with the expansion of physical travel. Historians conventionally date the modern era from the Age of Exploration. Every Western schoolboy knows the names of Cabot, Columbus, Cortez and is dimly aware that they "opened new worlds." This was an initial phase in the modern expansion of human communication. Gradually the technical means of transporting live bodies improved and physical displacement became an experience lived through by millions of plain folk earlier bounden to some ancestral spot. Geographical mobility became, in this phase, the usual vehicle of social mobility. It remained for a later time to make vivid that each mobile soma of the earlier epoch housed a psyche, and to reconstruct transatlantic history in terms of psychic mobility. It is the contemporary historian who now distinctively perceives the mass immigration into America as a traumatic process of psychic encounter with the new and strange.[7] We accent the contemporaneity of the psychic dimension, because the moral injunction to "look shining at new styles of architecture" is something new in the world.[8]

The expansion of psychic mobility means that more people now command greater skill in imagining themselves as strange persons in strange situations, places and times than did people in any previous historical epoch. In our time, indeed, the spread of empathy around the world is accelerating. The earlier increase of physical experience through transportation has been multiplied by the spread of *mediated* experience through mass communication. A generation before Columbus sailed to the New World, Gutenberg activated his printing press. The technical history of the popular arts suggests the sequence. The typical literary form of the modern epoch, the novel, is a conveyance of disciplined empathy. Where the poet once specialized in self-expression, the modern novelist reports his sustained imagination of the lives of others.[9] The process

is carried further in the movies and in radio-television dramas. These have peopled the daily world of their audience with sustained, even intimate, experience of the lives of others. "Ma Perkins," "The Goldbergs," "I Love Lucy"—all these bring us friends we never met, but whose joys and sorrows we intensely "share." The media create for us what has aptly been called "the world of the daytime serial."[10]

Radio, film and television climax the evolution set into motion by Gutenberg. The mass media opened to the large masses of mankind the infinite *vicarious* universe. Many more millions of persons in the world were to be affected directly, and perhaps more profoundly, by the communication media than by the transportation agencies. By obviating the physical displacement of travel, the media accented the psychic displacement of vicarious experience. For the imaginary universe not only involves more people, but it involves them in a different order of experience. There is a world of difference, we know, between "armchair travel" and actually "being there." What is the difference?

Physical experience of a new environment affronts the sensibility with new perceptions in their complex "natural" setting. The traveler in a strange land perceives simultaneously climate and clothing, body builds and skin textures, gait and speech, feeding and hygiene, work and play—in short, the ensemble of manners and morals that make a "way of life." A usual consequence for the traveler is that the "pattern of culture" among the strangers becomes confused, diverging from his prior stereotype of it and from his preferred model of reality.

Vicarious experience occurs in quite different conditions. Instead of the complexities that attend a "natural" environment, mediated experience exhibits the simplicity of "artificial" settings contrived by the creative communicator. Thus, while the traveler is apt to become bewildered by the profusion of strange sights and sounds, the receiver of communications is likely to be enjoying a composed and orchestrated version of the new reality. He has the benefit of more facile perception of the new experience as a "whole," with the concomitant advantage (which is sometimes illusory) of facile comprehension. The stimuli of perception, which shape understanding, have been simplified.

The simplification of stimuli, however, is accomplished at a certain cost. The displaced traveler's great pragmatic advantage

is that he must take responsive action toward the stimuli presented by the new environment. However painful this may be—as when, to take a simple case, he has lost his way and must ask directions in a language of which his mastery is uncertain—overt action does help to discharge the traveler's interior tensions. But the passive audience for mediated communications has no such discharge channel; the radio-listener's personal response to new stimuli remains confined to his own interior. The inhibition of overt active response is a learned behavior and a difficult one. It was common, in the early days of movies, for persons strained beyond endurance to throw themselves or some object at the screen to stop the villain from strangling the heroine. Even the old media hands among the youngsters of today will sometimes, at a particularly agonizing moment in the television show, hide their faces.

Thus the mass media, by simplifying *perception* (what we "see") while greatly complicating *response* (what we "do"), have been great teachers of interior manipulation. They disciplined Western man in those empathic skills which spell modernity. They also portrayed for him the roles he might confront and elucidated the opinions he might need. Their continuing spread in our century is performing a similar function on a world scale. The Middle East already shows the marks of this historic encounter. As a young bureaucrat in Iran put it: "The movies are like a teacher to us, who tells us what to do and what not." The global network of mass media has already recruited enough new participants in all corners of the earth to make "the opinions of mankind" a real factor instead of a fine phrase in the arena of world politics. There now exists, and its scope accelerates at an extraordinary pace, a genuine "world public opinion." This has happened because millions of people, who never left their native heath, now are learning to imagine how life is organized in different lands and under different codes than their own. That this signifies a net increase in human imaginativeness, so construed, is the proposition under consideration.

3. The "System" of Modernity*

A second proposition of this large historical order derives from

* For a fuller discussion of the material in this section, see my paper "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science* II (October 1957), pp. 266-275.

the observation that modern media systems have flourished only in societies that are modern by other tests. That is, the media spread psychic mobility most efficiently among peoples who have achieved in some measure the antecedent conditions of geographic and social mobility. The converse of this proposition is also true: no modern society functions efficiently without a developed system of mass media. Our historical forays indicate that the conditions which define modernity form an interlocking "system." They grow conjointly, in the normal situation, or they become stunted severally.

It seems clear that people who live together in a common polity will develop patterned ways of distributing *information* along with other commodities. It is less obvious that these information flows will interact with the distribution of power, wealth, status at so many points as to form a system—and, moreover, a system so tightly interwoven that institutional variation in one sector will be accompanied by regular and determinate variation in the other sectors. Yet, just this degree of interaction between communication and social systems is what our historical exploration suggests.

We differentiated two historical systems of public communication, Oral and Media, according to the paradigm: Who says what to whom and how? On these four variables of source, content, audience, channel the ideal types differ as follows:

	Media Systems	*Oral Systems*
Channel	Broadcast (mediated)	Personal (face-to-face)
Audience	Heterogeneous (mass)	Primary (groups)
Content	Descriptive (news)	Prescriptive (rules)
Source	Professional (skill)	Hierarchical (status)

In media systems, the main flow of public information is operated by a corps of professional communicators, selected according to skill criteria, whose job it is to transmit mainly descriptive messages ("news") through impersonal media (print, radio, film) to relatively undifferentiated mass audiences. In oral systems, public information usually emanates from sources authorized to speak by their place in the social hierarchy, i.e., by status rather than skill criteria. Its contents are typically prescriptive rather than descriptive; news is less salient than "rules" which specify correct behavior toward imminent events directly involving the larger population, such as tax collections and labor drafts. (Oral and media systems also differ sharply in recreational content, as we

shall see, but we here focus on informational content.) Even these prescriptive messages are normally transmitted via face-to-face oral channels (or via such point-to-point equivalents as letters) to the primary groups of kinship, worship, work and play.

Naturally, few societies in the world today give a perfect fit to either of these idealized sets of paired comparisons. America closely approximates the model of a media system, but people also speak to each other on public issues and the personal influence of the "opinion leader" is strong.[11] Conversely, Saudi Arabia corresponds to the oral system but operates its radio transmitters at Jidda.* As we move around the world, subjecting our ideal types to empirical data, various elements in the patterns begin to shift. Most countries are in some phase of transition from one system to the other.

But two observations appear to hold for all countries, regardless of continent, culture, or creed. First the *direction* of change is always from oral to media system (no known case exhibiting change in the reverse direction). Secondly, the *degree* of change toward media system appears to correlate significantly with changes in other key sectors of the social system. If these observations are correct, then we are dealing with a "secular trend" of social change that is global in scope. What we have been calling the Western model of modernization is operating on a global scale. Moreover, since this means that other important changes must regularly accompany the development of a media system, there is some point in the frequent references to a "world communication revolution." We here consider the more moderate proposition that a communication system is both index and agent of change in a total social system. This avoids the genetic problem of causality, about which we can only speculate, in order to stress correlational hypotheses which can be tested. On this view, once the modernizing process is started, chicken and egg in fact "cause" each other to develop.

To formulate the hypothesis in a manner suitable for testing, we selected indices of three principal sectors—socioeconomic, cultural, political—which could be compared in oral systems and media systems. The "profiles" were as follows:

* Be it noted, however, that these State-owned transmitters produce but a single broadcast daily. See UNESCO, *World Communication* (1956), p. 94.

Sector	Media Systems	Oral Systems
Socioeconomic	urban	rural
Cultural	literate	illiterate
Political	electoral	designative

To sharpen the differences, these profiles are stated in dichotomous fashion. The dogmatic appearance of this formulation should trouble no one, for we test them empirically as continuous variables on which differences are calibrated. Just as there is no perfect media system so there is no perfectly urban, literate, electoral society. Our model is probabilistic, our measures are distributive, and our test of fit is correlational.

Our procedure was to construct a matrix containing data on urbanization, literacy, voting and media participation. We handled these as indices of public participation in the four "sectors" as a whole, by expressing our data as the proportion of total population possessing each attribute. Thus, we defined *urbanization* as the proportion living in cities over 50,000; *literacy* as the proportion able to read in one language; *media participation* as the proportion buying newspapers, owning radios, and attending cinemas (all three items being integrated into a single index number); *electoral participation* as the proportion actually voting in national elections (obtained by averaging results for the five most recent elections). Participation in these four sectors, so defined, was taken to represent participation in the social system as a whole. Recall that the participant style of modern society, as contrasted with the isolate lifeways of traditional society, hinges on the *frequency* of participation by individuals.

In the next chapter, and in the case studies, we shall examine more closely the *quality* of participation by different types of individuals in different countries. Here we wish to compare existing nations in terms of overall participation in the sectors essential for modernization. This requires a simple frequency measure, which we obtained from UNESCO and other UN data on most countries of the world—ranging from 54 to 73 in number on the different indices.*

* The statistics were used as reported in UNESCO *World Communication* (1951). These were checked against other UNESCO sources for typographical errors and against the UN *Statistical Yearbook* and *Demographic Yearbook* for errors of information and computation. Wherever significant differences appeared which could not be reconciled, the case was excluded

Simple correlation by pairs showed that each factor in the set was significantly related to each other factor.* In the present case, it was "statistically significant" that literacy correlated with urbanism at .64, with voting at .80, and with media participation at .82. Each of these correlations was investigated further, with generally confirmatory results, as when literacy was correlated with each item in the media participation index:

Media Participation Items	Correlation with Literacy
Daily newspaper circulation	.75
Number of radio receivers	.74
Cinema seating capacity	.61

It is obvious that newspaper circulation should correlate better with literacy than does movie attendance, the enjoyment of which does not require literacy. The high correlation of radio receivers leads, for explanation, in another direction. Whereas building cinemas (in which *imported* feature films are shown) requires no modern technology, the mass production of radio receivers does require a fairly high level of industrialization.

We subsume industrialization under our index of urbanization. This is a key variable in our "system," for it is with urbanization that the modernizing process historically has begun in Western societies. Our next task, having shown that literacy and media participation are highly correlated, was to establish their interdependence with urbanism. For the historical literature on this point, while allocating great influence to the growth of cities, is not clear on several important questions: if urbanization is a necessary condition of modernization (meaning that certain other changes can occur only in cities), then what are these other changes that

from our analysis. Otherwise all "self-governing territories" are included. The writer is unable to offer any definitive evaluation of these UN data which are assembled from reports prepared separately by each nation. There are national differences in definition of indices and accuracy of reporting. Whereas magnitudes of "error" cannot be checked systematically, the direction of error, in those cases I have checked, always tend toward overstating one's progress in modernization—i.e., underdeveloped countries are likely to report larger rather than smaller estimates of urbanization, literacy, voting, etc.

* Correlation is a statistical procedure to determine whether independent series of events, when their joint occurrence is enumerated, turn out to have occurred together more often than would happen simply by chance—and, if so, how much more often. Readers desiring elucidation of other statistical terms used in these pages may refer to the index of W. A. Wallis and H. V. Roberts, *Statistics. A New Approach* (1956).

regularly occurred in any society when urbanization occurred? If urbanization is necessary to start modernization, how much of it is necessary (what is the "critical minimum")? Is there a point at which modernization, once started, can sustain itself without much or any further urbanization (is there a "critical optimum" for urbanization)?

We formulated these questions, for testing, in three specific hypotheses: (1) that critical limits, minimum and optimum, can be established for urbanization within which literacy will increase directly as urban population grows in all countries; (2) that countries which have not reached the minimum limit of urbanization will also be predominantly illiterate; (3) that countries which have exceeded the optimum limit of urbanization will also be predominantly literate. To test these hypotheses, we classified all 73 countries according to the data on literacy provided by UNESCO. We then found the mean urbanization for all the countries in each literacy group, as reported below.

Countries (N=73)	Literacy	Urbanization
22	Over 80%	28.0%
4	61-80	29.2
12	41-60	25.0
13	21-40	17.0
22	Under 20	7.4

Thus in all 22 countries less than 20% literate the mean proportion of population living in cities over 50,000 is only 7.4%. The "critical minimum" of urbanization appears to be between 7-17% of total population, for convenience one may say 10%. Only after a country reaches 10% of urbanization does its literacy rate begin to rise significantly. Thereafter urbanization and literacy increase together in a direct (monotonic) relationship, until they reach 25%, which appears to be the "critical optimum" of urbanization. Beyond this literacy continues to rise independently of the growth of cities. The surplus of 1.2% of urbanization in the second row is either insignificant, with only four countries, or else confirms the analysis. Between these limits of 10-25%, our findings indicate, the growth of cities and of literacy are closely interdependent.*

* These cutting points are somewhat arbitrary, of course, in the sense that their outcome is partly determined by the statistical input. Had urbanization been indexed by cities over 20,000 rather than 50,000 population, for example, the critical optimum on this continuum might well be located at

Having now established high pairwise correlations between urbanization-literacy and literacy-media participation, with critical optima for joint growth in each pair, we are in a position to suggest an interpretation in terms of historical phasing. The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases—literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, historically, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g., voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies. For countries in transition today, these high correlations suggest that literacy and media participation may be considered as a supply-and-demand reciprocal in a communication market whose locus, at least in its historical inception, can only be urban.

We shall later examine the idea that a common psychological mechanism underlies these phases—that it is the more empathic individuals who respond, in the first place, to the lure of cities, schools, media. Urban residence, schooling, media exposure then train and reinforce the empathic predisposition that was already present. On this view, the modern "style of life" can nowadays be acquired as a whole by individuals living in modernizing societies. This interpretation is quite plausible, but it does not clarify what happens to empathic individuals who are ready and able to modernize more rapidly and completely than their society permits. A

20% rather than 25%. Cf.: "An average rate of progress of less than 10% per decade is not sufficient to keep the number of illiterates in a country from increasing. . . . An average decennial rate of 25% or more seems to ensure an actual reduction in the number of illiterates in the total population." UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries* (1953), pp. 175, 178.

large and important class of Middle Easterners are in this position today. Our data on 73 countries, distributed over all the continents of the earth, indicate that many millions of individuals everywhere are in the same position. This further suggests that the model of modernization follows an autonomous historical logic—that each phase tends to generate the next phase by some mechanism which operates independently of cultural or doctrinal variations. To understand the position of those millions who may be caught in some historical lag today, we look more closely at our three phases.

The first phase, then, is *urbanization*. It is the transfer of population from scattered hinterlands to urban centers that stimulates the needs and provides the conditions needed for "take-off" toward widespread participation. Only cities require a largely literate population to function properly—for the organization of urban life assumes enough literacy to read labels, sign checks, ride subways. A population of illiterates might learn that they are not to smoke and spit in the subway, or that Express trains run on the local tracks between 5 and 7 P.M. But trial-and-error can be a wasteful societal procedure. The primitive social function of literacy, as of all skills, is to reduce waste of human effort. Its higher function is to train the skilled labor force with which cities develop the industrial complex that produces commodities for cash customers, including newspapers and radios and movies for media consumers. Cities produce the machine tools of modernization. Accordingly, increases of urbanization tend in every society to multiply national increases in literacy and media participation. By drawing people from their rural communities, cities create the demand for impersonal communication. By promoting literacy and media, cities supply this demand. Once the basic industrial plant is in operation, the development of a participant society passes into a subsequent phase. When voluntary urbanization exceeds 25%, thereby assuring the conditions of modern production, further urbanization no longer automatically guarantees equivalent increases in consumption. The need then shifts to modernizing the conditions which govern consumption.

Of this second phase, *literacy* is both the index and agent. To spread consumption of urban products beyond the city limits, literacy is an efficient instrument. The great symbol of this phase is the Sears-Roebuck catalogue. The mail-order house replaces the peddler only when enough people can read catalogues and write

letters. In this sense literacy is also the basic skill required for operation of a media system. Only the literate produce the media contents which mainly the literate consume. Hence, once societies are about 25% urbanized, the highest correlation of media consumption is with literacy. We shall soon describe more fully how literacy operates as the pivotal agent in the transition to a fully participant society. Here we wish to suggest that by the time this second phase gets well under way, a different social system is in operation than that which governed behavior in a society that was under 10% urban and under 40% (roughly, less than half) literate. For, when most people in a society have become literate, they tend to generate all sorts of new desires and to develop the means of satisfying them.

It is this interplay of new desires and satisfactions which characterizes the third phase of modernization, namely *media participation.* Once people are equipped to handle the new experiences produced by mobility (via their move to the city), and to handle the new experiences conveyed by media (via their literacy), they now seek the satisfactions which integrate these skills. They discover, as did The Grocer in Balgat, the tingle of wondering "what will happen next"—the tingle which sounds the knell of traditional society, of routinized lifeways in which everyone *knew* what would happen next because it had to follow what came before. To satisfy this new desire requires the personal skill of empathy which, when spread among large numbers of persons, makes possible the social institution of media participation. This was the phase in which the West developed the "penny press," early symbol of the accelerating supply and demand for media products, which continues today with the pocket radio and the portable TV. It is characteristic of this phase, as the production-consumption reciprocal of media participation develops, that economists come to find production of radio sets a useful index of growth in total industrial production.[12]

For, rising media participation tends to raise participation in all sectors of the social system. In accelerating the spread of empathy, it also diffuses those other modern demands to which participant institutions have responded: in the consumer's economy via cash (and credit), in the public forum via opinion, in the representative polity via voting. Other studies had already shown high pairwise correlations between our indices and economic participation—e.g., around the world literacy correlated at .84 with per

capita income and at .87 with industrialization.[13] Accordingly, we undertook to establish their connection with political participation, in such fashion as to determine whether the interdependence between these four participant sectors was genuinely "systemic."

We did this by multiple correlations of the four indices already described. This procedure enabled us to rotate each index in the matrix, thereby obtaining the simultaneous degree of correlation between it and all three of the other indices. Based on 54 countries (those reporting data on all four indices), the coefficients obtained in turn for each dependent variable are reported below.

Dependent Variable	*Multiple Correlation Coefficient*
Urbanization	.61
Literacy*	.91
Media Participation	.84
Political Participation	.82

* A notable feature of all literacy correlations was their stability, regardless of sample size. The correlation of .82 with media participation was for N=54 countries; for N=73 countries it was .84. (Standard deviation was 31.4.) UNESCO literacy data come grouped in five categories, each covering 20 percentage points. All other data were ungrouped.

The size of these coefficients demonstrates that the relationship between the four sectors *is* systemic. These independent tests of the participant style of life do in fact "go together" in 54 extant societies. Beyond this, their ascending order appears to support the historical phasing that has been sketched.

That the urbanization coefficient should be lowest is as expected. Our earlier data indicated that about 10% of the population must be urbanized before the "take-off" occurs. At this point it becomes "economical" to develop literacy and media; hence urbanization and other modernizing trends grow together for a period.[14] But after a certain degree of urbanization exists, then further growth of cities no longer affects other factors in the same degree. Our analysis locates this "critical optimum" at 25%, after which urbanization ceases to play a determinant role because enough people have been relocated in cities to assure the personnel requirements of modern production. As many countries in our sample long ago passed this urbanizing optimum, and since have turned to other factors to maintain self-sustaining growth, urbanization naturally yields the lowest (though still high) coefficient.

That the literacy coefficient is highest also supports our analysis.

Literacy is the basic personal skill that underlies the whole modernizing sequence. With literacy people acquire more than the simple skill of reading. Professor Becker concludes that the written word first equipped men with a "transpersonal memory"; Professor Innis writes that, historically, "man's activities and powers were roughly extended in proportion to the increased use of written records."[15] The very act of achieving distance and control over a formal language gives people access to the world of vicarious experience and trains them to use the complicated mechanism of empathy which is needed to cope with this world. It supplies media consumers, who stimulate media production, thereby activating the reciprocal relationship whose consequences for modernization we have noted. This is why media participation, in every country we have studied, exhibits a centripetal tendency. Those who read newspapers also tend to be the heaviest consumers of movies, broadcasts, and all other media products. Throughout the Middle East illiterate respondents said of their literate compatriots: "They live in another world." Thus literacy becomes the sociological pivot in the activation of psychic mobility, the publicly shared skill which binds modern man's varied daily round into a consistent participant lifestyle.

We come, then, to political participation. Democratic governance comes late, historically, and typically appears as a crowning institution of the participant society. That the voting coefficient is so high indicates that these 54 countries have achieved stable growth at a high level of modernity. In these countries the urban literate tends to be also a newspaper reader, a cash customer and a voter. The modern "system" of self-sustaining growth operates across the land in these 54 countries—as their cities sprouted suburbs, as their urban districts grew into "urban regions," their national increase of literacy and participation kept pace. This capacity to incorporate continuing social change within the existing framework of institutions has become a distinctive structural feature of the developed modern societies. In a century that has reinstated revolution as a method of social change, they have managed to adapt their own accelerated growth mainly by nonviolent procedures.

What of the other countries? What, in particular, of the 19 countries that had to be dropped from our multiple correlations (reducing our sample from 73 to 54) because they failed to supply

data on themselves? Good social auditing is itself an index of modernity—only the rational modern perspective seriously believes that keeping records on one's past and present will help to shape future changes in a desirable direction; only modern institutions have developed the techniques of self-observation which sustain this belief. In our world survey, the countries with the least adequate statistical records tended also to be the least developed countries. What of them?

4. The Hurdles of Modernization

When the underdeveloped lands of the world are tested by our model of modernity, the enormous hurdles in the path to modernization stand out more clearly. What the West accomplished gradually over three past centuries is not so easy for the East to achieve rapidly in the present century.

Take the factor of physical mobility, which initiated Western take-off in an age when the earth was underpopulated in terms of the world man-land ratio. Land was to be had, more or less, for the finding. The great explorers took over vast real estate by planting a flag; these were slowly filled with new populations over generations. Since then, the earth's population has multiplied many times, while its acreage has remained about the same. Today exploration occurs mainly in outer space or inner psyche, while the world man-land ratio discourages international mobility. Immigration laws in the more developed countries are designed to keep underdeveloped peoples at home.

At home, in these countries, physical mobility still takes mainly the form of urbanization. But urbanization is no simple panacea for all ills. We have seen that its historic function is to stimulate take-off; thereafter it yields priority to other factors of self-sustaining growth. The critical limits of urbanization required in each country are a function of its population, more particularly of its man-land ratio. It is this which impedes take-off in many underdeveloped but overpopulated countries; where the man-land ratio is very high, urbanization is indispensable but hard to achieve according to rational plan. In such countries, natural increase tends to exceed growth of resources (including usable land) and population density rises steadily.

Sheer density of population, without countervailing urbaniza-

tion, operates in turn as an anti-literacy force in most societies. Education is cheaper when pupils live close together and hence, other things being equal, density should be associated with greater literacy. But, without urbanization, other things are *not* equal—i.e., the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth are much lower. This has a direct depressing effect on all public services, notably free public education. Dense nonurban societies, where national income is relatively small, tend to maintain relatively fewer schools by public funds; also, since per capita income is lower and less widely distributed, fewer individuals can afford to attend school.

Hence, the more people there are in a given area, the smaller is the proportion being educated and the harder it is to get a rising proportion of literates among them—until they begin to be redeployed into cities. In sparsely settled lands the influence of urbanization is less marked and literacy rates will probably respond directly to rises in per capita national income. But in populous societies urbanization is the intervening variable and is crucial for the take-off toward increasing literacy. Only when dense populations show a significant rate of urbanization do literacy rates begin to rise. The interaction of density and urbanism as factors conditioning literacy may be represented in the figure below.

DENSITY	URBANISM: High	URBANISM: Low
High	High Literacy	Low Literacy
Low	High Literacy	Indeterminate Literacy

In countries of high urbanization, as our correlations have shown, literacy will also be high regardless of density (e.g., Britain and Western Europe). Where urbanism is low, generally literacy also will tend to be low. (This consequence is less marked in countries of low density, hence the classification "indeterminate literacy.") But it is very clear that low urbanism plus high density goes

with low literacy in virtually all extant countries. To report only the most striking results of our several tests, correlation of literacy with density (defined as population per square kilometer) yielded a negative coefficient of —.60. This inverse relationship was about as consistently negative, for all 73 countries, as the correlation of +.64 between literacy and urbanization had been positive.

A similar result was obtained by correlating urbanism with media participation. For 54 countries the coefficient was .58. When the less developed countries were added, making a total of 73 countries, the coefficient dropped to .47. As striking as this decrease was the great "scatter" of data reported by the underdeveloped countries. Whereas the modern nations have achieved "optimum" relations between urbanism, literacy, media participation, the traditional societies exhibit extremely variant "growth" patterns (deviations from the regression lines). Some are more urban than literate, others more media participant than urban.

In the Middle East, two recent trends account for much of this imbalance. One has been the accelerated postwar movement to the capital cities in each country. This is "urbanization" for census purposes, but it seriously revises the historic meaning of the term. In Cairo, for example, there is a huge floating population with no home but the city streets. They attend no schools, do no work, get no cash, buy no goods. It would be more accurate to tally these involuntary urbanites as "internal rural refugees," but until some such auditing change is made the Egyptian census will continue to show a huge and growing surplus of urban over literate population. The second postwar trend is the rapid diffusion of cheap (or free) radio receivers among the rural populations of the Middle East. This again is an alteration of the Western model, in which media participation reflected a market mechanism —radios produced privately for profit were bought individually for pleasure. Radios distributed gratis by government facilitate "social control" rather than "individual participation"; they also explain why most Arab countries show an excess of radio-listeners over urban literates.

Such events introduce a new stochastic factor into the historical model of modernization—one that is not accounted for by the model. Such a factor is the effort by new governments around the world to induce certain symbols of modernity by policy de-

cisions, in a sequence which disregards the basic arrangement of lifeways out of which slowly evolved those modern institutions now so hastily symbolized. A stochastic factor may be a genuine innovation which will remake the model; or it may be a risk taken in ignorance of the model. The evidence now available suggests that, in the Middle East, we are usually dealing with the latter alternative.

An instance is the new global fashion to install some voting mechanism as a symbol of modern desires rather than as a functional agency of modern governance. Democracy has become a world fad, spread across national lines by symbolic *diffusion,* rather than an institutional outgrowth of needs internal to an increasingly participant society. As a result, some modernizing countries show extraordinarily high ("ahistorical") voting rates. Indeed, whereas voting correlates highly with the other variables in the modern countries, sharp deviations occur in Asia and the Middle East. Thus Egypt, in 1956, ordered its impoverished rural masses to "vote" in a single-option plebiscite, which gave Nasser the 97% endorsement common in such performances. These great "underdeveloped areas" have in common the historic poverty of their resources relative to the soaring heights of their current aspirations. They are inadequately urbanized, industrialized and literate, relative to their urge rapidly to install the symbols of modern participant society.

This answers one question only to raise another. Since the stability of modern societies has been associated over past centuries with the whole "system" of participant behavior gradually evolved, how can these new societies-in-a-hurry hope to achieve stability while acquiring mobility? The question is not rhetorical; the writer does not believe that he knows "the" answer. History is a matter of secular trends, not eternal laws, and the persistence of a certain pattern of social change in the past does not mean that things must always be so. On the contrary, the very act of describing past trends and clarifying the conditions of their occurrence may help to shape policies that can redirect the course of history. We turn then to a key problem of modernization in underdeveloped countries: How have they gone about diffusing the capacity for psychic mobility, along with other capacities that historically have equipped people for efficient functioning in participant society?

5. The Model of Transition

Our historical model provided suitable terms for describing the degree of modernization present in a given society at a given time. The indices of urbanization, literacy, media and political participation discriminated efficiently the relative positions in 1950 of very many countries on all the continents of the world. But the model was static to this point. A dynamic component was needed to show how a country *moved* from one phase to the next, why an urban person regularly *became* a literate and a radio-listener and a voter. Such a dynamic component must connect institutional changes with alterations in the prevailing personal style.

We had already identified the characterological transformation that accompanies modernization as psychic mobility, with empathy as its mechanism. The questions now were: how can empathy be tested? how can the results of such testing be collated with the indices of participant behavior? What we needed to learn was whether a person who shows high empathy also exhibits the other attributes, and vice versa. Since empathy is an autonomous personality variable, it is not revealed by any census data, but must be elicited through psychological testing of individuals. At this point the Middle East survey supplied the missing link. The interviews contained a set of nine "projective questions" which we used to test each respondent's empathic capacity:

1. If you were made editor of a newspaper, what kind of a paper would you run?
2. What do you think you miss by not knowing what the newspapers have to say?
3. How do you think people who go to the movies differ from those who don't?
4. If you were put in charge of a radio station, what kinds of programs would you like to put on?
5. If for some reason you could not live in our country, what other country would you choose to live in?
6. Suppose that I could tell you anything you wanted to know about (this country): What two questions would you be most interested in asking?

7. What is the biggest problem that people in the same circumstances as yourself face in life?
8. What do you think people in the same circumstances as yourself can do to help solve this problem?
9. Suppose that you were made head of the government. What are some of the things you would do?

What these questions have in common is that they ask the respondent to imagine himself in a situation other than his real one. They are "role-playing" questions that require, for responsiveness, some capacity to empathize—to imagine what it must be like to be head of a government, editor of a newspaper, manager of a radio station, or even "people like yourself." The strenuousness of such demands upon persons untutored in empathic skills was underlined by the many respondents, in every country, who thought of suicide rather than imagine themselves in these exalted ranks. "My God! How can you say such a thing?" gasped the shepherd, when Tosun put such questions to him.

The historical course of empathy was underscored for me, while working on these interviews, by an advertisement that came through the mail one morning. Printed across the envelope, in bold red letters, was the query: "Suppose you were the editor of *Time* . . ." The circular letter inside described the typical workday of a *Time* editor. An American mass-circulation magazine mails such an item to millions of names, assembled from a variety of "lists," confident that the "teaser question" on the envelope will be comprehensible, interesting and entertaining. In the Middle East, for many millions, such questions are baffling, disturbing, and even impious: "It has never been thus!"

Our task was to devise a method to determine the degree of association between empathy, as tested by these questions, and the lifeways of modernity. The solution of this problem provided our theory of modernization with the dynamic component needed to analyze ongoing changes in the Middle East today. Our solution was to show, empirically, that persons who are urban, literate, participant, and empathic *differ* from persons who lack any of these attributes—and differ on a significant personal trait which is distinctive of the modern style. Such a trait is "having opinions" on public matters. Traditional man has habitually regarded public matters as none of his business. For the Modern men in a participant society, on the contrary, such matters are fraught with interest and importance. A broad range of opinions on public questions can be taken as a distinctive mark of modernity. Accordingly, the central schema of this study can be represented in the basic typology of modernization below.[16]

The Basic Typology

Type		Literacy	Urbanism	Media Participation	Empathy	Opinion Range
Modern		+	+	+	+	1
	A	−	+	+	+	2
Transitional	B	−	−	+	+	3
	C	−	−	−	+	4
Traditional		−	−	−	−	5

If modernization is the transition to participant society, then the direction of change in public communication is toward a constantly expanding opinion arena. The significant mode of participating, in any network of human communication, is by sharing a common interest in the messages it transmits—i.e., by having opinions about the matters which concern other participants. (Nonparticipation, conversely, consists of neither knowing nor caring about the messages relayed through a given network.) In a large public network, such as that of a nation, perfect participation is impossible—and perhaps undesirable. A network would hardly be manageable in which all citizens attended to all messages and expressed opinions on all public questions. There are determinate limits—maxima as well as minima—to the degree of participation appropriate for particular networks. The modernizing tendency is toward networks that can handle maximum participation, and concurrently to develop the participants needed to man these networks.

A person becomes a participant by learning to "have opinions" —further, the more numerous and varied the matters on which he has opinions, the more participant he is. To rank each respondent as a participant in the Middle Eastern opinion arena, we counted the number and variety of items in the questionnaire on which he expressed *some* opinion (i.e., did *not* say "I don't know" or "I have no opinion"). This enabled us to find a number for each respondent which determined his rank-order in the column headed "Opinion Range." Those in rank 1 had the most opinions, those in rank 2

somewhat fewer opinions, and so on down to those in rank 5 with the fewest (or no) opinions.

We then sought to determine whether, as hypothesized, the higher a person's opinion range, the more likely he was to score high on all indexes of modernity. And so, as the scale patterns show, it turned out. The top opinion-holders (rank 1) typically were literate, urban, media participants, and high empathizers. Among illiterates, those living in cities tended to have more opinions (rank 2) than rurals. Among illiterate rurals, those with a significant measure of media exposure scored higher (rank 3) than those without such exposure. This left a group which—in terms of literacy, residence, media exposure—should have been homogeneous in the opinion range, but in fact was not. Some of these individuals had significantly more opinions than the others. The only satisfactory way to account for this divergence was by our personality variable—empathy. For what distinguished these illiterate, rural, nonparticipant individuals (rank 4) from their peers (rank 5) was a keener interest in impersonal matters, a deeper desire to become participants of the opinion arena. They were marked less by their manifest ways than by their latent wants.

Once this was clear, our data fell beautifully into place. For the true Transitional is defined, dynamically, by what he wants to become. What differentiates him from his Traditional peers is a different *latent structure* of aptitudes and attitudes (see Appendix).[17] The aptitude is *empathy*—he "sees" things the others do not see, "lives" in a world populated by imaginings alien to the constrictive world of the others. The attitude is *desire*—he wants *really* to see the things he has hitherto "seen" only in his mind's eye, *really* to live in the world he has "lived" in only vicariously. These are the sources of his deviant ways. When many individuals show deviation in this direction, then a transition is under way in their society. In the next chapter, we show empirically how this transition is at work in every Middle Eastern country, with results that spell the passing of traditional society from that area of the world.

Here we stress that the transition to participant society hinges upon the desire among individuals to participate. It grows as more and more individuals take leave of the constrictive traditional universe and nudge their psyche toward the expansive new land of heart's desire. The great gap is passed when a person begins to "have opinions"—particularly on matters which, according to his

neighbors, "do not concern him." The empathic skill which makes this possible is not highly valued in the traditional community. There people are taught to handle the ego with minimum awareness of alternatives to current practices—in the technical sense, compulsively. The Constrictive Self is the approved personal style. Self-manipulation, continuous rearrangement of the self-system to incorporate new experience, is regarded as unworthy of any person with "good character."[18]

The classic case is The Grocer of Balgat, repudiated on all sides as he sought to incorporate the new identities of his vicarious experience. The Balgati feared his opinions and called him "infidel." Tosun found his role-playing distasteful and wrote of him: "Although he is on the same level with the other villagers . . . he most evidently wishes to feel that he is closer to me than he is to them." The Transitionals, at various phases of modernization, are making their way toward an unclear future via a path replete with hard bumps and unsuspected detours. Their voyage entails a sustained commingling of joyous anticipations with lingering anxieties, sensuous euphoria with recurrent shame, guilt and puzzlement. From their changes of pace and their shifts of direction we learn how they perceive the terrain, its pitfalls and its promises.

A deep problem of values is imbedded in the life histories of these men-in-motion. The moral issues of modernization often are reduced to this: *Should* they want what they want? Since they want what we have, Western responses to this question usually reflect only our own value-dilemmas. Rather more relevant is the judgment of Middle Easterners on what they have and what they want. If we resist the temptation to adjudicate conflicting preferences among others, at least long enough to see how they adjudicate these options themselves, then we have a sounder basis than our own conventional values for moral judgment.

For example: a very powerful finding of our study is that Middle Easterners who are modernizing consider themselves happier than do those who remain within traditional lifeways. This is in striking contrast with the impressions conveyed by some observers, often from highly modern settings themselves, who feel that the undermining of traditional ways by new desires must be a net loss. Among such observers the passing of cherished images of passive peasantry, noble nomads, brave Beduin evokes regrets. But these regrets are not felt by the modernizing peasants, no-

mads, Beduin themselves, or felt less disapprovingly by them than by the moderns who study them and love the familiar way they used to be. Thus Tosun, the bright young modern from Ankara, gave his sympathy to the miserable intimidated Shepherd but only his indignation to the ambitious outspoken Grocer.

Deep sentiment for the splendid past can dim perception of its passing. So distinguished a commentator as Professor Hocking, when obliged to recognize the prevalence of modernist desires among Middle Easterners, does so with regret and even resentment:

> The most important single fact about these people, for the political discussions of the moment, is their rendezvous with CHANGE, the god of "modernity." They are in process of growth: and since this is so, they are no longer to be identified with what they were yesterday but rather with what they will be tomorrow.[19]

Sentiment here produces a misleading dichotomy. Yesterday is perceived as a splendid whole, now wholly gone. But this obscures the evident shaping of Middle East tomorrows by all their yesterdays and by what they seek each new today. There is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday. It is precisely by "the political discussions of the moment," so impatiently dismissed by Professor Hocking, that the Middle Eastern future will be devised and revised through a succession of tomorrows.

I take respectful issue with Professor Hocking because the issue is central in the perspective of this book. One can admire great achievements of the past without despising small efforts in the present. It is as a monumental summation of small efforts that many great achievements can be viewed. One such is the western achievement of a Participant Society, which is a summation of desires for personal betterment that led through centuries of "political discussions of the moment" to institutions of civil liberty, public welfare and democratic governance. In our view, disdain for the transitory controversies of politics springs from an erroneous theory that the Long-Run is somehow independent of its own sequence of short-runs. Our effort is rather to study the relatedness of political, economic, communication behavior among the Middle Easterners who are piecing together the grand design of their future society.

Until now we have stressed the psychological dimension because the great dramas of societal transition occur through individuals involved in solving their personal problems and living

their private lives. But certain of these dramas signify more for the future than others. Those Middle Easterners whose private lives have become permeated by the public questions will prove most enlightening for us. In the drama of modernization, those who have already incorporated the trends of the times (The Moderns) and those who have not yet been touched by them (The Traditionals) present a relatively static posture. The meaning of events is best clarified by those whom we perceive at the moment of "engagement"—a moment which occurs when an expansive Self, newly equipped with a functioning empathy, perceives connections between its private dilemmas and public issues. This is political consciousness, in the larger sense, and its acquisition distinguishes those who have been pierced by the present and in responding shape the future. The *Transitionals* are our key to the changing Middle East. What they are today is a passage from what they once were to what they are becoming. Their passage, writ large, is the passing of traditional society in the Middle East.